Reflections on Bertrand Russell’s ‘The Problems of Philosophy’

Bertrand Russell
‘The Problems of Philosophy’ is one the earliest and most popular books of the British analytic philosopher, Bertrand Russell. It’s a small book, but one asking the most difficult questions of philosophy and loaded with insight and wit. Russell was one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century. He sought to reconcile philosophy and science, drawing heavily from his expertise in logic and mathematics. Russell devoted a great deal of thought to the subject of knowledge and to the question, ‘What, if anything, do we truly know?’ As a rigorous analyst he launched this inquiry with a close examination of the fundamentals of human experience, seeking to find a solid basis upon which to build a theory of knowledge. In so doing, Russell was tackling one of the oldest, most bedeviling problems of philosophy: ‘What exactly is our relationship with the external world?” It has proven a difficult problem not only for philosophy, but one which impinges heavily on both science and religion.
Russell, like his rationalist predecessor Rene Descartes, begins by putting everything into doubt. He asks, ‘Of what, if anything, can I be absolutely certain.’ Descartes’ famous answer to this question was, ‘I think, therefore I am’. Russell however is not so sure of Descartes’ ‘I am’, since when he looks into his own experience he cannot find it. In ‘The Problems of Philosophy’ he remarks: ‘When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not upon the “I” which has the thought or feeling.’* Russell does not doubt that there is an experiencing ‘I’, but he doubts Descartes’ implicit assumption of a more or less permanent ‘I’ which is thinking. Russell is not at all certain that the ‘I’ who is aware of a specific brown table on two different occasions is, in any absolute sense, the same person. This notion of an impermanent or momentary self is not exclusive to Russell, but is expressly affirmed by some Buddhist schools of thought. What Russell does find and cannot doubt when examining his own experience is what he calls ‘sense-data’, specifically colours, sounds, sensations, tastes and smells. He notes that the sense-data which make up his brown table are directly intuited and immediately present. The brown patch is a brown patch, neither more nor less: it is what it is. The table, however, is another matter. It is a composite of sense-data representing something which supposedly continues to exist regardless of whether the observer is observing it or not. The various sense-data themselves are an appearance which cannot be questioned and what they represent as the table is also an appearance which cannot be doubted. What is open to doubt, however, is whether the appearance of the table is anything more than an appearance; in other words, whether the table in itself has a material existence independent of its appearance to an observer. Of course, common sense says it does. The person who every day goes into his study, sits down and writes at the same brown table will never seriously doubt that his table is real or that it exists independently of himself. Proving this, however, is not an easy matter and, in fact, there is no proof that any object truly exists beyond its appearance, although there are strong arguments in favor of inferring that it does.
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